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PATENT INFRINGEMENT AND





Traditionally, the development of case law and judicial
cases focused on whether the determination ofpatent infringement
would interfere with the status ofprior art in various jurisdictions.
The claim construction is often made according to the characteris-
tics of an invention as distinct from prior art to avoid the determi-
nation of literal infringement in order to bring prior art into the
scope of exclusive rights admitted by patent law. The defense of
prior art is also recognized against the application of the doctrine
of equivalents for the same purpose. However, no similar mecha-
nism exists under the determination of patent infringement to deal
with the practice of after-arising technologies by the infringer. In
other words, a dispute arises when the accuser takes advantage of
technologies to infringe upon the patent, which is not seen at the
application date of the above-mentioned patent. If the after-arising
technologies are unconditionally dominated by the patentee
through the assertion of literal infringement or the application of
the doctrine of equivalents, the risk of overcompensation to the pa-
tentee is possible, which results in opportunities to hinder the poli-
cy of technological improvement and cumulated innovation under
patent law. However, if it is undeniable that the after-arising tech-
nologies are not completely foreseen by the patentee, failure to in-
clude these technologies in the claim of a patent should not be at-
*The Article serves as part of the academic performance of the research project
(NSC 101-2410-004-036) sponsored by Taiwan National Science Council. The
author is grateful to the Taiwan National Science Council for its support, and is
solely responsible for all opinions reflected in the article.Associate Professor, College of Law, National Chengchi University in Tai-
wan; S.J.D., Maurer School of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington.
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tributable to the patentee. This article probes the reasonable al-
lowance of after-arising technologies in the determination of pa-
tent infringement. After reviewing the past approaches proposed to
resolve the issue of after-arising technologies and patent infringe-
ment, this article concludes that the analogous application of the
non-obviousness requirement to evaluate after-arising technolo-
gies is an optimal model to balance the conflicting interests be-
tween the adequate protection of the patentee and the public inter-
est, which would lead to fostering technological improvement and
cumulated innovation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distinguished from traditional tangible properties, patents
must rely upon their claim and specification to provide a public
notice about the scope of exclusive rights.' Because the determina-
tion of patent infringement is subject to the violation of exclusive
rights,2 the claims of a patent play a key role in deciding the acts
that constitute patent infringement. Generally, there are two types
of tests under patent law for the determination of patent infringe-
ment: (1) the literal infringement test and (2) the doctrine of equiv-
1 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND.
L.J. 779, 789-91 (2011). See also Article 69(1) of the European Patent Conven-
tion: "The extent of the protection conferred by a European patent or a European
patent application shall be determined by the claims. Nevertheless, the descrip-
tion and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims." There are similar provi-
sions in Article 58 of Taiwanese Patent Act and Article 59 of Chinese Patent
Act.
2 See Article 28 (1) of Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods ("the TRIPS Agree-
ment): "A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a)
where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not
having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale,
selling, or importing for these purposes that product; (b) where the subject mat-
ter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the owner's con-
sent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for
sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained direct-
ly by that process." See also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1); ALEXANDER HARGUTH &
STEVEN CARLSON, PATENTS IN GERMANY AND EUROPE-PROCUREMENT,
ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE-AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 186
(201 1)(citing Article 9(1) of German Patent Act); Article 58of Taiwanese Patent
Act; Article 11 of Chinese Patent Act.
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alents ("DOE"). The former focuses upon the claims of a patent to
determine whether the accused product or method was element-by-
element read into any claim, 3 whereas the latter secures the fair-
ness of patent protection by evaluating patent infringement where
the accused product or method was made through insubstantial
improvement about the patent.4 According to patent law, the time
for the determination of literal infringement is set on the date of
the patent application. However, a patent infringement usually oc-
curs after a patent is issued. When the infringer took advantage of
new technologies arising after the date of the patent application, it
is worth considering whether such technologies would break the
public notice of a patent and endow the patentee with an inade-
quate stretch of the patent.5 Similarly, the doctrine of equivalents
also concerns the issue of new technology, especially on the
ground that it is applied in accordance with the time of patent in-
fringement. 6 This article discusses the effect of new technologies
3 See F. Scott Kieff et al., Principles of Patent Law-Cases and Materials, 819
(5th ed. 2011); HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 2, at 182-83; DOUGLAS
CLARK, PATENT LITIGATION IN CHINA 122-25 (2011).
4 As a matter of fact, the term of "the doctrine of equivalents" is usually used in
U.S. patent case law. However, a similar function of the doctrine may be found
in various jurisdictions. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 36, 39-40 (1997) (the U.S. representative case); HARGUTH &
CARLSON, supra note 2, at 183-85 (the authors organized the four elements
adopted German Supreme Court to evaluate the equivalent infringement);
T.H.K. Co. v. Tsubakimoto Seiko Co., Case No. Heisei 6(o) 10831, Case No.
Heisei 6(o) 1083, Supreme Court of Japan (Saikou Saibansho), February 24,
1998, in PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW-
CASES AND MATERIALS 478-483 (2nd. ed. 2008) (translated by Toshiko
Takenaka) (the Japanese representative case); Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] 1 All ER 667, [2005] RPC 9, at 47-48
(U.K. adopted "the purposive construction" to achieve the same goal of the doc-
trine of equivalents.); CLARK, supra note 3, at 125-28.
5 On the academic literature in the issue of "after-arising technologies" or "later-
developed technologies", see, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach ofLiteral
Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing Construction and the
Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 497 (2008).
6 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. at 37. Perhaps
other jurisdictions are not always to determine an equivalent infringement.
However, when the infringement involves the issue of after-arising technolo-
gies, they unavoidably will face a similar issue if such technologies lead to
overcompensation over the patentee and hinder simultaneously improvement
and cumulative innovation in relevant technologies.
2015]
3
Shen: Patent Infringement and Reasonable Allowance of New Technologies
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXV: 293
on the determination of patent infringement in order to ensure that
the determination of patent infringement is justified in meeting the
jurisprudence of patent law and to prevent the patentee from being
overprotected. Another significant issue is to detect the reasonable
allowance for the incorporation of new technologies into the de-
termination of patent infringement under a literal infringement test
and the doctrine of equivalents.
This article relies mainly on a theoretical construction to
justify the analogous concept of the non-obviousness requirement
under patent law to ascertain the reasonable allowance of after-
arising technologies on the determination of patent infringement.
Some approaches that may be used to deal with the issue of after-
arising technologies are reviewed in accordance with the rationale
of patent law. This article proposes the refinement of two ways to
strengthen the position on the issue of after-arising technologies.
One is to provide the theoretical ground of the proposed model for
the resolution of disputes of after-arising technologies. The second
is to attempt to make the model workable in various jurisdictions.
The issue of after-arising technologies under patent infringe-
ment is rarely a main concern of judicial decisions. The issue of
after-arising technologies has not been popular under patent law;
not because it has been ignored, but because an ideal model for de-
ciding the issue has not been put forward. Consequently, in some
cases, the courts choose to resolve the issue through claim con-
struction or the application of DOE instead of positively proposing
a legal ground to avoid the absolute interference of exclusive
rights in after-arising technologies and without stating a theory to
support its position. This article hopes the proposed model could
deliver a justified base under patent law for reference in the future
development of case law or in judicial cases on the issue of after-
arising technologies under patent infringement.
296
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1I. PATENT INFRINGEMENT AND REASONABLE ALLOWANCE OF
AFTER-ARISING TECHNOLOGIES.
A. Predicament of Literal Infringement and Doctrine of
Equivalents
Under patent laws in various jurisdictions, patent infringe-
ment is determined through the practice of claims or the doctrine
of equivalents. On one hand, without the patentee's authorization,
practicing claims to materialize the abstract technologies contained
in the claims-for the purpose of the manufacture of patented
products or the execution of patented process-constitutes literal
infringement under patent law. On the other hand, even if the in-
fringer did not practice any claim completely, having changed one
or more elements of the claim, such partial materialization may
still be evaluated as an infringement on the condition that the
changes reflected in the accused product or process, compared
with the original elements of the claim, never led to a substantial
difference under the observation of a person having ordinary skill
in the art ("PHOSITA"). That is, judicially-developed, the doc-
trine of equivalents (hereinafter "DOE") 7. In spite of the shared
function of both literal and equivalents to secure patent exclusive
rights, the jurisprudences behind the two infringements are very
distinct. Moreover, the two infringements also have deficiency in
the determination of infringement, which could possibly run
against the gist of patent law, thus motivating the improvement
and cumulative innovation of technologies.
Patents are intangible properties. Patent claims serve as public
notice to demarcate the boundary of the exclusive rights enjoyed
by the patentee. The patent's specification is read to clarify ambig-
uous parts of claims for the interpretation of the width of a patent.
Under the peripheral system, as in U.S. patent law, in alerting the
prohibition of an absolute importation of the specification into the
interpretation of claims, case law has not denied the function of the
7 See Toshiko Takenaka, Extent of patent protection in the United States, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom and Japan: examination through the concept of
person having ordinary skill in the art of the invention' in PATENT LAW AND
THEORY--A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 450-61 (2008).
2015] 297
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specification for ascertaining the inventor's real intention in draft-
ing the claims for the patent application. 8 Furthermore, to be self-
evident under an eclectic system, as in Europe, Taiwan, and China,
the affirmation that the specification is among the most significant
sources for the construction of claims is codified. 9 Consequently,
when claims work with the specification to deliver information
about a patent, the public theoretically should grasp the scope of
the patent as well as the extent to which the claims might be re-
duced into practice. In this point, the achievement of public notice
of a patent seems to justify the patentee to take advantage of the
literal infringement to seek remedies aainst third parties' practic-
ing patent claims without authorization
However, in reality, claim construction is awkward because
the ultimate purpose of such construction is to probe the intention
of the inventor in designing the claim. The plain and reasonable
interpretation of a claim is not made by referring to an ordinary or
technical dictionary that the public can easily access to ascertain a
common meaning of any element in the claim without bearing ex-
8 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(U.S.). U.K. patent also complies with the peripheral system for claim construc-
tion. See WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS § 6-02 (5th ed.
2003); See MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., GLOBAL ISSUES IN PATENT LAW 183-84
(201 1)(Kirin Amgen Inc. v. Holechst Marion Roussel Ltd., House of Lords,
[2004] UKHL 46, at § 20.).
9 Traditionally, the German patent law had adopted the central definition system
to determine the most adequate scope for a claim through claim construction
conducted by the court, which is possibly broader than what was granted as a
patent at the beginning. In other words, the courts have the authority to build up
the patent right's scope based upon the initial grant of the patent in accordance
with the real development of objective circumstances. However, in order to
strengthen the public notice about the patent, it is a popular tendency to follow
the eclectic system in Europe, reflected in Article 69(1) of the European Patent
Convention. See MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., GLOBAL ISSUES IN PATENT LAW
183-84 (Kirin Amgen Inc. v. Holechst Marion Roussel Ltd., House of Lords,
[2004] UKHL 46, at § 22.). See also Article 58 of Taiwanese Patent Act; Article
59 of Chinese Patent Act. On the past experience and evolution of U.S. patent
about the central definition system, Charles W. Adams, The Doctrine of Equiva-
lents: Becoming a Derelict on the Waters of Patent Law, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1113,
1116-20 (2006).
'o See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND.
L.J. 779, 789 (2011).
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tra costs, but the inventor's own lexicography." Under patent law,
to respect the meaning of a claim intended by the inventor, intrin-
sic evidence is prioritized over extrinsic evidence for claim con-
struction when any ambiguity exists regarding the element of a
claim read between the patentee and third parties. 12 Only on occa-
sions where the intrinsic evidence cannot resolve the conflicting
interpretations of a claim, can extrinsic evidence be justified in
coming into play in claim construction. According to the experi-
ence of various jurisdictions on patent law, it seems that the use of
intrinsic evidence has not worked as efficiently as the public antic-
ipated in exploring the real intention of the inventor regarding
what the elements of the claim should be. It is well known the
specification is a significant source of intrinsic evidence. However,
instead of settling disputes on claim construction, the specification
often causes uncertainty of interpretation due to the interplay be-
tween a claim and its specification.' 3 Although the importation of
examples to fix the interpretation of the scope of a claim in the
specification is prohibited, in some cases, the specification may
serve as a limitation. In other cases, the specification is allowed in
a claim that meets the real intention of the inventor.1 4 Consequent-
ly, without definite guidelines, the correlation between a claim and
its specification obfuscates the distinction of occasions where the
specification may be the limitation of a claim from those where the
interpretation of a claim may break through the specification.
From this point, the public seems to bear more costs in recognizing
the public notice of a claim because a claim could not directly
convey its reasonable scope by its wording. Such phenomena sub-
stantially hinder the function of public notice of a claim, and fur-
ther affect the justification of the assertion of patent literal in-
fringement. Aside from the weak public notice of a claim because
of the difficulty in setting up a clear standard for claim construc-
]1 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1316.
12 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1320-22. Generally speaking, the intrinsic
evidence includes the claim wording, the specification, and prosecution history,
the extrinsic evidence contains the dictionaries, the expert testimony, and tech-
nical treatises.
13 See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J. LAW &
TEC 2, 7-9 (2000).
14 See Peter Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and
Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 746-748 (2010).
2015] 299
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tion, claim construction also faces the predicament where the de-
termination of literal infringement would contradict the gist of pa-
tent law, which always prevents the possession of prior art from
the patentee and secures technological improvement and cumula-
tive innovation. 1
5
The determination of literal infringement under patent law is
made through the comparison of the accused product and the claim
to ensure all elements of the accused products are read into the
claim on a corresponding basis. If a claim is mechanically inter-
preted to include the elements of the accused products without
checking the capacity allowable under patent law, the patentee will
be given a chance to take advantage of prior art or after-arising
technologies to detect excessive interests that the patent law finds
unbearable. Under this situation, the overcompensation through
literal infringement surely will collapse the interest balance be-
tween the patentee and the public, as well as the sound evaluation
of patent practice established by the patent law system.
For example, under a hypothetical scenario, we assume that
Claim 1 of Patent A is about an article, composed of Element XI,
Element Y, and Element Z. Each accused product made and sold
could be divided into Element X2, Element Y, and Element Z. The
accused product is read in the aforesaid Claim 1 because Element
XI goes through claim construction to cover Element X2. In other
words, the manufacture and sale of the accused products constitute
the literal infringement of Claim 1 of Patent A. However, it can be
proven that the technology for making the accused product had
been available prior to the application date of Patent A. It means
15 In order to determine a literal infringement, prior art is often used to distin-
guish the claim to conclude an accurate claim interpretation. Moreover, the de-
fense against patent infringement about the patent invalidity caused by the loss
of novelty also proves that the exercises of exclusive rights under patent law
should be off the scope of prior art. Certainly, the prior art limitation for the ap-
plication of DOE has been admitted in the various jurisdictions. See MENELL, id
at 723; DONALD CHISUM, 5B-18 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.04 [2] (2012) (Lex-
isNexis); Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d
677 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Mario Franzosi, Equivalent in Europe, E.I.P.R., 2003,
25(6), 238; Are Stenvik, Protection of Equivalents under Patent Law-Theories
and Practice, 32 IIC 1, 12-13 (2001); T.H.K. Co. v. Tsubakimoto Seiko Co.,
supra note 4, at 481.
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that the manufacture and sale of the accused product had already
been serving as prior art for Patent A, according to patent law. It is
supposed that such prior art would not affect the patentability of
Patent A. It may be observed from case law that the determination
of literal infringement lacks a special mechanism to detect if prior
art would be incorporated in claim construction. While the manu-
facture and sale of accused products are evaluated as a literal in-
fringement, it is easy to bring the technology positioned as prior
art directly into the possession of the patentee over Claim 1 of Pa-
tent A. Certainly, it is not deniable that claim construction could
potentially fine-tune the patent to preclude prior art from going
within any claim of a patent. However, such effect would be the
result of extra manipulation through specially considering prior art
instead of the necessary function inherent in the application to de-
termine literal infringement.
We also set a scenario for after-arising technologies. The in-
fringer made and sold the accused product, which comprises Ele-
ment X3, Element Y, and Element Z in the market. It is assumed
that Element X3 was not developed until the infringement date of
Patent A. However, Element X3 is interpreted as within the defini-
tion of Element XI of Claim 1 of Patent A, according to claim
construction. Consequently, when the manufacture and sale of the
accused products constituted the literal infringement against Claim
1 of the patent, the patentee simultaneously includes Element X3
as part of Claim 1 for the exercise of exclusive rights under patent
law. Because there was no opportunity to fix the wording related
to Element X3 in Claim 1 at the time of the application date, it
may be reasonably inferred that Element X3 was never prosecuted
with Element Y and that Element Z, as a whole, secures the patent
eligibility and patentability. Under this scenario, it is worth further
questioning to determine, if Element X3 were not prosecuted, if
Element X3 is justified in becoming the subject matter over which
the patentee could exercise exclusive rights.
Comparatively, the function of DOE under patent law merely
concentrates on the ground of fair protection for the patentee. Al-
so, DOE works to prevent the infringer from escaping unreasona-
bly the liability caused by the literal infringement merely by mak-
ing insubstantial changes to Claim 1 for the manufacture and sale
of the accused products. In addition, it is commonly thought that
2015]
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the critical date for the application of DOE is not established at the
application date of patent, but rather at the time when the in-
fringement occurred. Compared with literal infringement, the sce-
narios mentioned above seem to happen in the application of DOE.
We assume that the accused product contains Element X4, Ele-
ment Y, and Element Z. Although Element X4 is out of the scope
of Element XI, in this scenario, based upon an insubstantial
change from Element XI to Element X4, the manufacture and sale
of the accused products are still evaluated as an infringement on
Claim 1 of Patent A. As the determination of literal infringement
does, DOE possibly leads to an extension of Claim 1 to subsume
Element X4 as part of the scope of exclusive rights. However, the
technology used to make the accused product existed before the
application date of Patent A. In fact, the accused products are posi-
tioned as prior art of Patent A. In another scenario, if Element X4
is developed after the application date of Patent A, the application
of DOE also determines the accused products as a patent infringe-
ment, even though the accused products never existed in the mar-
ketplace at the application date of Patent A.
B. Novelty and Patent Infringement
Prior art has played a core role in determining the patentabil-
ity of an invention under patent law. An invention may be trans-
ferred to a patent if it can be conceived to transcend the technolog-
ical status set up by prior art. Not only does the patentability make
an invention distinguished from other relevant and analogous
technologies existing at the date of patent application through spe-
cific elements or limitations, but it also secures the advance of an
invention over the current technological development, according to
the evaluation of a PHOSITA when a patent application is filed.
The former is the requirement of novelty under patent law. 16 On
the one hand, the novelty requirement encourages new inventions
under patent law to correspond to the continuing demand of indus-
tries for technologies. The legislative purpose of the novelty re-
quirement is declared in various jurisdictions to emphasize that the
16 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2011) (U.S. Patent Act); Article 54(2) of the European
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patent system is established to promote the technological devel-
opments of industries through the innovation of new things.' 7 Any
possible innovation derives from new things or new uses of old
things. 18 It cannot be imagined that an invention containing old
things would be granted as a patent to exclude the public from ac-
cessing the invention. Without technological contributions, it is
hard to claim a patent for an invention that merely reorganizes old
things. On the other hand, from the angle of the limitation of ex-
clusive rights, novelty is justified because it protects the public
from being deprived of the benefits already contributed by prior
art.19 The significant meaning of innovation is to create a new sta-
tus, in which the inventions exist to produce more technological
benefits shared by the public than the ordinary things did under an
old status. The new status should be evaluated prospectively and
dynamically, while the old status remains steady and static. More-
over, the new status always parallels the old one without interfer-
ence.20 Anything transposed directly from the old status never es-
tablishes a new status. Theoretically, under the element-element
17 See DONALD CHISUM, 5B-18 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01(2013) (LexisNexis).
18 Even according to the continental law system, the method for treatment of the
human is always as an exception of patentability, but the substance or composi-
tion used in such treatment may be considered patentable on the condition that
its use is new. See Article 54(4)&(5) of the European Patent Convention.
19 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM AND MARY L. REV.
371, 374, 379-84 (2005).
20 As this article addressed, the new technological status encouraged by patent
law is never expected to subsume the technologies within prior art. Claim con-
struction to exclude literal infringement from prior art and the prior art defense
against DOE are both strong proof
21 On determination of novelty, the strict identity rule and the inherent doctrine
are implemented to ensure that the invention is anticipated by known prior art.
The strict identity rule focuses on the comparison between the invention and a
single document as prior art. Any element of the invention read into the docu-
ment as prior art leads to loss of novelty of the invention under patent law. Even
though the difference resulting from the aforesaid comparison is presented, he
inventor still suffers from novelty as long as the difference would be recognized
by PHOSITA or enabled by the document as prior art. That is the inherence doc-
trine. See Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law's In-
herent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1108-11 (2008); RICHARD
HACON & JOCHEN PAGENBERG, CONCISE EUROPEAN PATENT LAW 42-44 (2d.
ed. 2008) ; HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 2, at § 2.51. The critique was
made to question that the application of the inherent doctrine has substantially
2015]
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comparison for the determination of literal infringement, it is pos-
sible to read the prior art into a claim of a patent through claim
construction, provided that the accused product or process was
made or practiced based on technologies defined within the prior
art of the patent. However, this result contradicts the legislative
policy of the requirement of novelty under patent law and makes
no difference in entitling the patentee to take possession of bene-
fits already enjoyed by the public before the patent application, in-
stead of the harvest resulting from any innovation. By the same to-
ken, the application of DOE also runs into the above-mentioned
predicament by subsuming prior art to determine patent infringe-
ment. Consequently, the prior art of a patent cautions us that a le-
gal boundary derived from the prior art always includes claim con-
struction and the application of DOE to determine the patent
infringement.
22
C. Non-obviousness and Patent Infringement
Compared with the requirement of novelty under patent law,
non-obviousness is required to ensure that an invention moves be-
yond prior art in an inventive quality in order to be granted a pa-
tent, even if the invention was made to meet the requirement of
novelty. When an invention is evaluated with reference to prior art,
the inventive quality beyond prior art does not merely show in
technological difference and improvement. Further, the require-
ment of non-obviousness relies more attention upon whether such
the difference or improvement is a necessary development, in
blurred the line between the determination of novelty and the evaluation of non-
obviousness. See Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE
L.J. 919, 954-55 (2011).
22 Professor Lemley proposed the concept of novelty, pointing to the need to re-
view some significant and systematical issues under U.S. patent law and think-
ing that the point-of-novelty is conducive to achieving the goal of promoting
innovation. In the limited meaning of my argument, the concept of novelty point
actually indicates a further idea on the symmetry of novelty over the contribu-
tion of an invention. Hence, novelty might serve as a signal for the patentee to
be wary of the reasonable scope of exclusive rights endowed by patent law. An-
ything outside novelty will be seriously scrutinized to ascertain if prior art is
preempted by literal infringement or DOE. On the concept of novelty point, see
Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253, 1274-75 (2011).
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terms of PHOSITA, achieved by the teaching, suggestion, and mo-
tivation of prior art, which combines with the fundamental
knowledge of PHOSITA and other objective circumstances, such
as customer demands in the market.2 3 If the affirmative answer is
confirmed, the invention fails to satisfy the requirement of non-
obviousness.
The requirement of non-obviousness has two significant
meanings, both of which relate to the legislative policy on patent
law. First, an invention that was conceived merely by following
the path driven by prior art recognized by a PHOSITA makes it
impossible to implement the innovation policy inherent in patent
law.24 If this invention were qualified as a patent, the access of the
23 Non-obviousness, among patentable requirements, is named by the U.S. pa-
tent law system, and derives from the approach of difference evaluation admit-
ted by Article 103 of U.S. Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. 103 (2011) states: "A patent for
a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed in-
vention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed inven-
tion as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in
which the invention was made." Although Article 103 was amended in 2011,
the amendment merely reflects the system's shift from "First to Invent" to "First
inventor to file"(similar to the "First to file" system under most jurisdictions).
The most significant meaning of the amendment to Article 103 is presented in
the critical data to evaluate the requirement of non-obviousness set at the patent
application, other than at the invention conceived. No strong evidence has
shown changes in related doctrines or principles about the evaluation of non-
obviousness. The representative case in modem U.S. patent law, please see KSR
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419-22 (2007). As to the development of
European patent law, the approach of problem solving has been traditionally
adopted to evaluate the requirement of "Inventive Step"( similar to the concept
of non-obviousness). See Under this approach, there are three main steps: (1)
determining the closet prior art; (2) establishing the objective technical problem
to be solved; (3) considering whether or not the claimed invention, starting from
the closet prior art and the objective technical problem, would have been obvi-
ous to the skilled person. Please see Adelman, supra note 8, at 130-137 (Ex-
cerpting Actavis UK Limited v. Novartis AG case. See also HACON &
PAGENBERG, supra note 21, at 53-55. The authority of non-obviousness or in-
ventive step under the European Patent Convention is Article 56, stating: "An
Invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to
the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art...."). See also
Article 22 of Taiwanese Patent Act and Article 22 of Chinese Patent Act.
24 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. at 421("When there is a design need
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public to ordinary logics and knowledge derived from prior art
would be blocked. Such patents also would frustrate the technolog-
ical improvement and further innovation of prior art.25 In this sit-
uation, the patentee would be given the opportunity to occupy the
benefits contributed by prior art. Simultaneously, through the ex-
clusive rights endowed by patent law, the patentee might strength-
en its control over other inventions, which were derived from pri-
or art within the range of prior art's inventive quality. Second,
since the requirement of non-obviousness indicates the inventive
quality of a patent, it may be used as a basis to recognize the extent
to which a patented invention exceeds prior art in light of the eval-
uation of a PHOSITA.26 Excellency of inventive quality over prior
art contributed by the patentee is justified to support the assertion
of exclusive rights enjoyed by the patentee under patent law.27 In
other words, the benefits resulting from the requirement of non-
obviousness for the public are an integral consideration in com-
pensating the increased costs borne by the public, which are in-
curred by the execution of exclusive rights.
or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the
known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated
success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and com-
mon sense.").
25 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1007 (1997) ("The only clear way to avoid infringing
on a patent is to use a product that was in the prior art-an approach which does
not capture any of the value of the patented invention.").
26 See Lemley, Point of Novelty, supra note 22, at 1274-75.
27 See Alan L. Durham, Patent Symmetry, 87 B.U.L. REV. 969, 971 (2007)
("The architect of a unified system would be tempted to re-imagine equivalence,
if equivalence there must be, as a symmetrical manifestation of the obviousness
principle. In other words, looking backwards in time from the date of the inven-
tion, what the applicant has added to the prior art must be nonobvious in order
to be patentable; looking forward in time, what the accused infringer adds to the
claimed invention must be nonobvious in order to avoid infringement."). See
also Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and Se-
quential Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 475-78 (2012) (Professor
Landers compared the invention with related prior art to determine the adequate
scope of damages under patent law.).
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D. Patent Infringement and After-arising Technologies
1. Impact of After-arising Technologies on Literal Infringement
The elements of a claim are not always static, especially when
they are drafted in an abstract manner to describe a device or com-
ponent that has an expected function.28 Although the claim con-
struction of literal infringement should be fixed at the date of the
patent application, the comparison of all elements of the accused
product and a claim is inevitably vulnerable to the perception of a
PHOSITA at the date of patent infringement. 29 In particular, the
claim construction may entitle the patentee to include specific el-
ements in the scope of exclusive rights, which are formed by the
technologies not recognized when the patent application was ini-
tially filed. In other words, even if all elements of an accused
product or process are read into a claim for the determination of
literal infringement, partial elements of the product or process are
the results of new technologies developed after the date of patent
application. As mentioned above, under patent law, scholars usual-
ly recognize such new technologies as after-arising technologies.
For example, when a personal storage device serves as an element
in a claim and is expected to cover a floppy disk at the date of pa-
tent application, it is possible for the patentee to read a USB flash
drive into a claim as a personal storage device at the date of literal
infringement, provided that the infringer practiced the claim to in-
clude an accused product as having a flash drive as an element. In
order to carry through on the public notice of a patent, the golden
28 See Dank L. Burk and Mark Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 29, 32-33 (2005). Currently, American scholars of patent law
have been concerned about the functional claiming of software-related inven-
tions would be against the policy of patent law to encourage technological im-
provement or cumulated innovation. See, e.g., Lemley, Mark A., Software Pa-
tents and the Return of Functional Claiming (October 12, 2012). Stanford
Public Law Working Paper No. 2117302. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117302 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2117302;
Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law's Functionality Malfunction and the Prob-
lem of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 1399
(2013).
29 See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-
Arising Technology, supra note 5, at 497.
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rule is the determination of literal infringement should be set at the
date of patent application. However, patent law never teaches the
public how to define the boundary of the aforesaid public notice
such that even third parties take advantage of new technologies
that are unforeseeable at the date of patent application. Through
the comparison of all elements, literal infringement seems una-
voidable to practice the claim.30 In addition, patent law, any doc-
trine case law, or established judicial decisions did not lead us to
exemption from the literal infringement of after-arising technolo-
gies. Even worse, we are never instructed by patent law to distin-
guish literal infringement involving after-arising technologies from
those just committed through technologies that are known when
the patent application was filed. That is why more than one aca-
demic observation of the interaction between the literal infringe-
ment and after-arising technologies concluded that the time al-
lowed for the determination of literal infringement has
substantially been set at the date of patent infringement. 3' Because
the author emphasizes the requirement of non-obviousness under
patent law, it is worth noting that, while the requirement of non-
obviousness ensures more excellent inventive quality than prior art
does to qualify an invention as a patent, the scope of exclusive
rights enjoyed by the patentee should not be beyond the contribu-
tion of the inventive quality confirmed by non-obviousness. Mean-
ing that in terms of literal infringement, the interpretation of a
claim seems limited by the contribution of the inventive quality of
a patent, compared with prior art. It is difficult to imagine that pa-
tent law would entitle a patentee to the exclusive rights to an infi-
30 See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Super-
Guide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir.
2004)(Judge Michel concurring) ("Construing 'regularly received television
signal,' 'radio frequency information,' and 'mixer' in the '578 patent, the major-
ity holds that these terms encompass receiving and processing digital signals not
transmitted by television broadcasters at the time the patent issued. As in the
majority opinion, I treat these three terms together because they present the
common issue of whether digital signals fall within the literal scope of the
claim; that is because the latter two terms involve downstream processing of the
'regularly received television signal."').
31 See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104
MICH. L. REv. 101, 103 (2005).
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nite extent, even subsuming the technologies beyond the original
contribution of a patent into a claim that the exclusive rights are
always secure against unauthorized practices. Consequently, the
exquisite symmetry between the inventive quality and the exclu-
sive rights bolstering the justification of claim construction would
collapse, owing to the interference of after-rising technologies with
the determination of literal infringement.
2. Impact of After-arising Technologies on Doctrine of
Equivalents
In fact, the issue of after-arising technologies also confronts
the application of DOE. According to patent law, DOE is applied
to provide equitable remedy to the insufficiency of the assertion of
literal infringement when third parties merely made an insubstan-
tial change to elements of a claim in order to escape the compari-
son of all elements of an accused product or process and a claim.32
Based upon fair protection for the patentee, DOE is allowed to
function beyond the limitation of a claim to evaluate an accused
product or process derived from a claim through insubstantial
changes as a patent infringement, thus paralleling the literal in-
fringement. In other words, on the condition that the accused
product or process, compared with the claim, run (1) substantially
the same way (2) in order to approach substantially the same re-
sult, (3) under substantially the same function, the accused product
or process will be caught by DOE as a patent infringement. 33
Moreover, besides the aforesaid tripartite test, the known inter-
changeability, being evaluated from the technological difference
between the accused product or process and a claim, may lead to
the determination of patent infringement under DOE, provided that
the interchangeability can prove insubstantial changes of the claim
32 In the development of traditional U.S. patent law, fairness has been among the
most significant concerns in establishing the doctrine of equivalents. See Graver
Tank v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-608 (1950); Michael J. Meurer
& Graig Allen Nard, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Invention, Refinement and
Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93
GEO. L.J. 1947, 1960-67 (2005).
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made by the accuser.34 It is noted that the application of DOE un-
der patent law is subject to the time of patent infringement, other
than the date of patent application instructing the determination of
literal infringement. In the author's observation, a possible reason
for preferring the time of patent infringement under DOE is that
case law or the development of judicial cases in various jurisdic-
tions places much emphasis on preventing unscrupulous copyists
from merely exploiting the patent without any substantial contribu-
tion to the patent improvement or re-innovation, but by making a
minor technical adjustment to a claim to exempt from literal in-
fringement. Consequently, the most persuasive reason why DOE is
applied on the time basis of infringement seems to favor fairness to
the patentee, instead of, under case law, adding an exceptional rule
into the original public notice policy of a patent focusing upon the
date of patent application. For example, U.S. patent case law re-
cently reiterated that DOE is never intended to expand the claim
scope of a patent, but takes advantage of exclusive rights to
achieve the goal of fairness under patent law.
35
However, even if the application of DOE never contradicts
the jurisprudence of claim construction and merely achieves a nec-
essary equitable result of fairness, it cannot be denied that the ex-
clusive rights under patent law, enhanced by the mechanism of
DOE, may easily bring after-arising technologies into the scope of
a claim, as the claim construction under literal infringement may
do. According to case law or the development of judicial cases, it
is found that DOE application faces more exceptions than the de-
termination of literal infringement does. The author's analysis of
the exceptions of DOE yielded three possible aspects of jurispru-
dence behind case law and the development of judicial cases. One
possible direction of thought is to reserve sufficient room for cu-
mulated innovation. This thought represents the establishment of
an all-element doctrine serving as an exception to DOE. The all-
element doctrine exempts third parties from patent infringement
34 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36, 39-
40 (1997).
35 See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,
684 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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under DOE, as long as they could develop any element not includ-
ed in a claim of the patent.
36
The second possible direction of thought concerns the trust of
the public in disclosing the idea of the claim drafter, on the behalf
of the patentee, about a claim, or its specification, that forms the
original boundary of a patent, or any adjustment to a claim during
patent prosecution. To secure the former trust against the distortion
of public notice, the exception of "public dedication" is recognized
under patent law.37 If a patentee selected to disclose the examples
of a specific element in the specification, instead of including them
directly in a claim, and these examples should have been included
in the aforesaid claim for the interpretation of the aforesaid specif-
ic element, DOE will not be allowed to incorporate the alternative
interpretation of a specific element of a claim in the specification
into claim construction. To clarify, when third parties substituted
an alternative for a specific element in a claim, and this substitu-
tion was not disclosed in the claim but in the specification, the pa-
tentee was deprived of any allowance to apply DOE to find the ac-
cused product or process infringement. Another DOE exception, in
connection with trust in public notice, is "prosecution history es-
toppels. ' 38 Under this exception, if the patentee amended a claim
of the patent to ensure patentability during the patent prosecution,
the scope of exclusive rights will be limited to the amended claim,
even though the patentee seeks the application of DOE, unless the
element corresponding to an amended element had been unfore-
seeable at the date of patent application. 39 Consequently, it may be
observed that in prosecution history, estoppels have assumed the
trust of the public upon the patentee's decision regarding the
amendment of a claim for patentability that produces a notice of
the scope of the exclusive rights, and has fixed the application of
36 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. at 28-30. The Eu-
ropean states seem to either put less emphasis on this rule or question funda-
mentally the necessity of the all-element requirement on DOE. See Beloit Tech-
nologies, Inc. v. Valmet Paper Machinery, Inc., [1995] P.R.C. 705 (U.K.);
Stenvik, supra note 15, at 17.
37 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., 285 F.3d 1046
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
38 Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. at 30-34.
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DOE into the amended claim inasmuch as DOE will not be in-
volved with unforeseeable elements corresponding to the amended
element.
The third possible direction of thought tends to protect prior
art from the exploitation of the patentee through the application of
DOE. It is called the defense of prior art. 0 The justification for
this defense is that if prior art has established an existing order the
public relied upon to develop technologies or existing benefits the
public enjoyed, or is enjoying, in the public domain, this status
should not be broken because of functions of the patent law sys-
tem. Alternatively, if DOE is applied to cover, instead of distin-
guish from, prior art in the exclusive rights, it would contravene
the gist of patent law by encouraging the continuous innovation of
industries.
E. Reasonable Allowance of After-Arising Technologies
According to traditional exceptions, case law or judicial cases
tend to remedy the possible distortion to the function of public no-
tice of a claim and the inappropriate expansion of exclusive rights
over prior art resulting from the application of DOE. However, it
seems difficult to find any idea delivered or hinted at by case law
or judicial cases made under the continental legal system to deal
with the issue of after-arising technologies connected with patent
infringement, and to determine the broadest capacity of a claim al-
lowed to contain after-arising technologies through asserting literal
infringement and applying DOE. In order to avoid a loose allow-
ance of after-arising technologies, which would frustrate the cumu-
lative innovation of technologies, academics are much more con-
cerned about how to establish a specific approach to resolving the
problem of inadequate enrichment for the patentee caused by after-
arising technologies.
40 Wilson Sporting Goods Co v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d at 684-85.
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1. The Approach of Narrow Claim Construction under Literal
Infringement
Theoretically, a couple of possible approaches to mitigate the
negative effects caused by after-arising technologies were intro-
duced to the determination of literal infringement and application
of DOE. One possible way to deal with the issue of after-arising
technologies is to narrowly interpret against any ambiguous terms
of a claim, and then leave the reasonable scope of a claim to be de-
cided by DOE.4' This line of thought seems to express a meaning-
ful indication that DOE is better fitted to assume after-arising
technologies are against patent infringement than the determina-
tion of literal infringement is. Since the ambiguous terms of a
claim are vulnerable to the discretion of claim construction, nar-
rowing the interpretation of a claim, to the extent that the status of
technology in such interpretation would comply with that at the
patent application date, is considered effective in protecting a
claim from being enriched by after-arising technologies. Simulta-
neously, this thought also relies greatly upon DOE to correspond
appropriately to after-arising technologies. Perhaps the most pos-
sible ground for this stand might be recognized as the result of fol-
lowing the inherent characteristic of DOE, which is legally ex-
posed to after-arising technologies according to the date of patent
infringement.
However, it seems neither the tripartite test nor the insubstan-
tiality test would work to evaluate the reasonable allowance of af-
ter-arising technologies in the scope of exclusive right against pa-
tent infringement. Instead of the evaluation of after-arising
technologies, the application of DOE always concentrates on the
fairness of patent protection. From this point, DOE is never inher-
ently designed to resolve a dispute about after-arising technologies
under patent infringement. As a matter of fact, according to U.S.
patent case law, the application of DOE is not even capable of dis-
cerning whether the technologies covered by DOE as patent in-
fringement were foreseeable at the patent application date. Alt-
hough the defendant raised the defense of prosecution history
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estoppels against the application of DOE, the Supreme Court
found a way for the patentee to overcome the defense, provided
that the patentee would prove the unforseeability of specific alter-
natives over amended elements of a claim at the patent application
date.42 In other words, the effects of prosecution history estoppels
possibly led to the result that the patentee merely constrained the
application of DOE to the literal scope of the amended claim.
However, the court thought that the patentee should not complete-
ly bear the rigid legal effects of the application of DOE to bar the
coverage from unforeseeable corresponding elements. A special
exception was eventually fixed to assuage the defense of prosecu-
tion history estoppels so that the patentee could still assert the
DOE to protect unforeseeable technologies. From this point, even
though the jurisprudence existing behind the aforesaid unforesee-
ability test works to refine the application of DOE, it should be
42 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. at 740-41.
In this case, for the purpose of patentability, the plaintiff own two patents for an
improved magnetic rodless cylinder. While the inventions under the first patent
(the Carroll patent) has been amended during the patent application by adding
the new limitation so that the inventions contain a pair of sealing rings, the se-
cond patent (the Stoll patent) has also been amended to have the sleeve made of
a magnetizable material. After the two patents concerned were granted, the de-
fendant sold the infringing cylinders, which have a single sealing ring and their
sleeves were made of nonmagnetizable alloy. Notwithstanding the application
of the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit en banc held that the prosecu-
tion history estoppel keeps the patentee from asserting the patent infringement
on the ground that the patents concerned have ever amended to secure the pa-
tentability. However, the Supreme Court adopted a flexible way to interpret the
prosecution history estoppel, and found the exceptions for such the estoppel.
The Supreme Court addressed the concept of unforeseeability:
There are some cases, however, where the amendment cannot
reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent.
The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the
application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear
no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in ques-
tion; or there may be some other reason suggesting that the
patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described
the insubstantial substitute in question. In those cases the pa-
tentee can overcome the presumption that prosecution history
estoppel bars a finding of equivalence.
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recognized that DOE never automatically functions to implement
any mission of interest refinement pursued by unforeseeable tech-
nologies. Under patent law, unforeseeability is possibly among the
factors that are considered when evaluating the significance of af-
ter-arising technologies in the determination of patent infringe-
ment.43 As we mentioned above, since the DOE fails to deal with
the issue of unforeseeable technologies, it is hard to anticipate that
it would consummate the interest consideration about the reasona-
ble allowance of after-arising technologies when a patent is in-
fringed.
2. The Approach of Revised Peripheral Concept
The second direction of thought stems from the fundamental
review of the patent law system regarding claim construction. Un-
der the peripheral system, the uncertainty of claim interpretation,
as well as the designed extension of exclusive rights through the
DOE, is susceptible to the arbitrary interference of after-arising
technologies without adequate means to check the justification of
such technologies. The growth of a claim from the patent applica-
tion date seems inevitable according to the practical experience of
claim construction. In shifting to the central system, the core of an
invention should be established for public notice in the scope of
the patent's exclusive rights. In this system, the realistic boundary
of a patent is determined by the court's assessment of the reasona-
ble development of the inventive core at the time patent infringe-
ment occurred.
44
Theoretically, there is no distinction between literal infringe-
ment and equivalent infringement. Based on the recognition of the
core of an invention and its reasonable expansion to build up the
patent scope, claim construction may work against the patent in-
fringement that was determined by either literal infringement or
DOE under the peripheral system.45 Perhaps focusing on the spe-
cific characteristic of the inventive core to establish the patent
43 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 1083, 1089-1105 (2009).
44 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking
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scope under the central system, the issue of after-arising technolo-
gies would not be seriously taken. However, the same issue is ex-
pected to arise when the reasonable expansion of a claim is desired
to decide what acts constituted patent infringement. It should be
admitted that when theoretically compared with the mechanical
application of DOE for the pursuit of fair protection, the central
system finds more room for the court to build up the reasonable
scope of exclusive rights through interest consideration, inclusive
of after-arising technologies. In practice, it is still worth exploring
through further observation whether the issue of after-arising tech-
nologies is necessarily the concern of claim construction under the
central system. Proposing any adjustment over the peripheral sys-
tem with reference to the jurisprudence of the central system is un-
doubtedly conducive to the enhancement of the function of public
notice over the patent scope, and the justification for claim con-
struction. 46 However, the issue of after-arising technologies, as
well as its delicate consideration of interest seems to have an un-
certain status, even though the court could seize the opportunity to
deal with the issue under the model of claim construction in the
central system.
3. The Approach of Refined Claim Construction on "thing" and
"meaning"
A paradox occurs when the fixation of the literal scope of a
patent at the time of the application date in theory collides with the
growth of the scope at the infringement date in reality. A thought
was proposed to settle such paradox by refining claim construction
regarding "thing" and "meaning. ' ' 47 In terms of patented products
46 Id. at 1780-83. See also Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76
U. CHI. L. REv. 719, 772-74, 775-76 (2009) ("The cognitive science literature-
and common sense-also demonstrate that the choice of claiming by characteris-
tic or by exemplar might affect content notice and assessment of protectability.
After abstracting away the interpretive rules that have developed for current pa-
tent claiming, the choice of claiming system does not, in and of itself, affect the
breadth of the set of protected embodiments but for its sometimes deleterious
effect on the protection of developments incorporating after-developed technol--c
ogies.").
47 Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising
Technology, supra note 5, at 513-14.
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with reference to a corresponding claim, the intrinsic properties
may be found to distinguish themselves from other kinds of prod-
ucts. 48 In other words, the intrinsic properties constitute the essen-
tial feature of patented products.49 Any and all other properties are
classified as extrinsic properties. Instead of substituting for intrin-
sic properties, extrinsic properties merely serve to supplement
some materials or components in order to strengthen the function
or structure of patented products.
50
With regard to meaning, patented products may be defined as
either "denotational meaning" or "ideational meaning."'" The for-
mer works to stand for such products in the world, whereas the lat-
ter is helpful to distinguish such products from the same kind of
things by specifying them with expression. 52 Based upon the divi-
sion of "thing " and "meaning", a possible way to resolve the dis-
putes of after-arising technologies under patent law is to provide
different treatments of claim construction. Because the intrinsic
properties of patented products express core characteristics of the-
se products, it is best to hold these patents' interpretation in the
claim according to the technological status of the patent applica-
tion date.53 Relatively, the claim interpretation of extrinsic proper-
ties, in order to supplement intrinsic properties, seems to also
make it allowable to consider after-arising technologies to deter-
mine patent infringement. 54 As to the interpretation of a claim's
meaning, a similar model may be used to keep the status of denota-
tional meaning of patented products at the application date, and to
give the ideational meaning a flexible interpretation regarding af-
ter-arising technologies.55
Although the division of "thing" and "meaning" establishes a
new perspective for probing into the reasonable allowance of after-
arising technologies under claim construction, it seems doubtful
48 Id. at 521-23.
49 Id. at 523-25.
5old. at 521-23.
51 Id. at 537-38.
52 Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising
Technology, supra note 5, at 539-42.
53 Id. at 530-33.
54 ld. at 533-36.
55 Id. at 545-48.
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whether the grounds for the division always follows the jurispru-
dence of patent law that instructs the claim construction to deter-
mine adequate scope of the exclusive rights. Literal infringement
is admitted under patent law to secure the patentee's domination
over the practice of claims pursuant to the status of public notice
of such claims that stand by the filing date of a patent. Simultane-
ously, when any coverage, coming within the exercise of exclusive
rights through claim construction, excessively contravenes the
public notice of a patent, the determination of literal infringement
should be seriously scrutinized to insure no unjust enrichment
would be made to the patentee, or if an unbearable cost would be
shouldered by the public, especially regarding potential inventors
of technological improvement or cumulative innovation.
This article focuses on the issue of after-arising technologies,
which possibly develop against the public notice of a patent and to
unfairly favor the patentee. However, instead of being divided by
resorting to exclusive interest consideration and evaluation under
patent law, the recognition of the intrinsic and extrinsic properties
of patented products originally comes from ordinary people's ob-
servation without any clear indication of claim construction. The
intrinsic properties may be used to present some essential charac-
teristics of the patented product. Although these characteristics
serve to distinguish the patented product from other things, they
are not necessary to function from the evaluation of a PHOSITA
under patent law. In other words, the essential characteristics of
patented products are not equivalent to the core of a claim reflect-
ed in patented products that would be evaluated by a PHOSITA,
compared with prior art. Consequently, it is worth questioning
whether using after-arising technologies to practice a claim and to
materialize intrinsic properties would result in opportunities where
the patentee might take advantage of literal infringement to assert
a broader scope of a patent than that tolerated by the core of a
claim. Theoretically, it is possible that applying after-arising tech-
nologies to the intrinsic properties of patented products for assert-
ing literal infringement is still justified by the perception of a
PHOSITA because the determination of such literal infringement
never influences the evaluation of the core of a claim. According
to a similar argument, the phenomena ought not to be ignored
where the extrinsic properties augmented by the after-arising tech-
318
26
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss2/3
PA TENT INFRINGEMENT
nologies bring about a metamorphosis in the core of a claim, and
the right to remedy the literal infringement under this situation
would make the patentee's exclusive rights go beyond the bounda-
ry of a claim. It seems problematic to rely heavily upon the divi-
sion of "thing" to give adequate interest consideration between
claim construction and after-arising technologies under patent law.
The division of "thing" sometimes is vulnerable to the risk of de-
viation from the evaluation of a PHOSITA on a claim.
Since the division of "meaning" is observed from the angle of
linguistics, not a PHOSITA's perception, the dispute of after-
arising technologies arguably would make claim constriction
through such division run into a predicament similar to that in-
cuffed by the division of "thing." Even though the division of
"thing" and "meaning" better induces the settlement of after-
arising technologies under claim construction, it seems difficult to
prevent the same issue from occurring in the application of DOE.
On one hand, DOE is inherently designed to function at the -tech-
nological status of patent infringement. On the other hand, under
the paramount jurisprudence of fair protection instructing the
DOE, there is little room for other interest consideration made by
the division of "thing" and "meaning" to work with the gist of fair
protection under the DOE. Eventually, the division of "thing" and
''meaning" in the DOE is not helpful in dealing with the issue of
after-arising technologies.
4. The Approach ofAnalogous Enablement
Patent law's enablement requirement could also serve as lev-
erage to deal with the issue of after-arising technologies on either
application of the DOE or determination of literal infringement. 56
It is well known that the original function of enablement is to se-
cure the public's access to a patent by referring to specification
without undue experimentation. 57 In particular, at the expiration of
56 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, supra note
43, at 1093-94; Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's Posses-
sion Paradox, 23 HARV. J. LAW & TEC 1, 40-43 (2009).
17 35 U.S.C. § 112(a): "The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
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a patent, the requirement of enablement is compatible with the gist
of patent law, which prevents exclusive rights from substantially
dominating the public domain where the expired patent is located.
Were it not for the mandatory enablement of a patent's specifica-
tion, some patentees might take advantage of insufficient disclo-
sure in the specification to keep information necessary for the
practice of the patent exclusive. In this situation, due to an inven-
tor's poor disclosure of patent information, even though the ex-
pired patent entered the public domain, the patentee is the only one
capable of successfully practicing such patent with reasonable
transaction costs.
Secrecy of patent information is tantamount to an illegal ex-
58tension of the term of a patent. Consequently, the granting of a
patent is justified merely on the condition that the patentee ful-
filled its obligation to disclose sufficient information for patent
practice at the date of patent application. Insofar as the contribu-
tions of the patentee to her patent enablement, the possession of
the patent is affirmed under patent law.59 The scope of possession
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention"; Article 83 of the European Patent Convention: The European
patent application shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and
complete for it to be carried out be a person skilled in the art; In re Wands, 858
F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1998); HACON & PAGENBERG, supra note 21, at 100-
01.
58 See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 124 (4th ed. 2013).
59 As a matter of fact, the controversial issue happens if the written description
is separate from the enablement as an independent requirement of patentability
under the same authority of section 112 (1) of the U.S. Patent Act. U.S. case law
seems to support the independence of written description and addresses the
function of written description is to delimit the scope of claims possessed by the
patentee through sufficient disclosure. The academic literature questions this
position and thinks that the function of written description is inherent in the re-
quirement of enablement under patent law. On the development of U.S. case law
in this issue, please see Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559
(Fed. Cir. 1997). On the reflection from academic criticism, please see Martina
I. Schuster, Sufficient Disclosure in Europe, Is There a Separate Written De-
scription Doctrine under European Patent Convention? 76 UMKC L. REV. 491,
502-04 (2007); Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written
Description Requirement in Patent Examination, 104 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 382, 385-87 (2010).
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entitles the patentee to assert the exclusive rights against patent in-
fringement.
60
Based upon the possession of patent concept, it seems the re-
quirement of enablement under patent law could be used to detect
the reasonable allowance of after-arising technologies as a defense
against patent infringement. In other words, when patent infringe-
ment is made by third parties through the uses of after-arising
technologies, either as literal infringement or as the application of
the DOE, the accused product or process would be hypothetically
regarded as a claim of infringed patent. Furthermore, it should be
observed if such claim were practiced by a PHOSITA without un-
due experimentation pursuant to the specification of the infringed
patent.6' The resulting affirmative answer indicates that the afore-
said after-arising technologies are within legal possession of the
patentee. 62 Therefore, it is reasonably allowed that the patentee in-
voke patent infringement to bring those after-arising technologies
into the scope of exclusive rights. This is the test of enablement.
Following the example mentioned above, it is assumed the infring-
er used Element X5 with Elements Y and Z to manufacture and
sell the patented product that is claimed a combination of Elements
X, Y and Z as Claim 1 under Patent A, without the patentee's au-
thorization. There are two simultaneous preconditions for this sce-
nario. According to the aforesaid fact, manufacture and sale with-
out the patentee's consent constituted patent infringement by either
the determination of literal infringement or the application of the
DOE. In addition, compared with Element X, Element X5 is with-
in the definition of after-arising technologies under this article.
60 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d at 1360 (Judge Newman's
additional views : "The practical utility on which commercial value is based is
the realm of the patent grant; and in securing this exclusionary right, the patent-
ee is obliged to describe and to enable subject matter commensurate with the
scope of the exclusionary right.").
61 See Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, supra note 43, at 1084 ("The
enablement doctrines restricts the scope of an inventor's claim so that it remains
commensurate with the contribution to technological progress that the inventor
has disclosed in her specification.").
62 Professor Collins also analyzed three possible models for adopting the ena-
blement concept to evaluate if the after-arising technologies might be included
in the scope of exclusive rights, respectively, "The Foreseeability Rule," "The
Identity Rule" and "The Complementarity Rule." Id. at 1083-85.
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The enablement test is expected to probe into whether the specifi-
cation of Claim 1 under Patent A would enable the infringing
product that comprises Elements X5, Y and Z. If a PHOSITA
could refer to the specification to manufacture the infringing prod-
uct without undue experimentation, it might be inferred the patent-
ee is justified in covering the infringing product in claim construc-
tion or equivalent extension of Claim 1 by asserting patent in-
infringement. It is arguable the concept of possession under the
test of enablement sets a possible justification under patent law to
probe into a reasonable allowance of after-arising technologies un-
der patent infringement. However, the test is still worth reviewing.
Ordinarily, the enablement requirement is assumed under the
capability of the patentee of providing sufficient disclosure on the
specification. It is the patentee's obligation to prove its possession
over the invention that is attributable to the subject matter of a pa-
tent. Any failure to sufficiently disclose in order to enable a
PHOSITA to practice the patented invention with undue experi-
mentation, either because of a lack of due diligence of the patentee
or the patentee's other marketing considerations, would deprive
the patentee from possessing such invention, through the rejection
of the patent application, the revocation of the granted patent ac-
cording to the system of public reviews, or the defenses of patent
invalidity for patent infringement.
63
The real meaning of the aforesaid obligation under patent law
is to impose the enablement requirement upon the patentee. And
the disadvantages would be delivered to the patentee provided that
the patentee did not satisfy this requirement but should have done
so according to the expectation of patent law. Nonetheless, after-
arising technologies occur after the patent application date and are
not always predictable at the time when the patentee drafted the
claims and the specification for patent application. Compared with
the fulfillment of the patent's enablement for the patent application
63 U.S. patent law has enacted an opposing system against the granting of a pa-
tent in 2011, which is named as "Post-Grant Review." See 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-29
(2011). The petition of post-grant review may be raised within nine months after
the grant of a patent. Another mechanism, named "Inter Partes Review" serves a
similar function, but stands a position for supplement of post-grant review. Any
petition should be raised after nine months from the grant of a patent. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 311-19 (2011). Cf Articles 99-105c and 138 of the European Patent
Convention.
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to possess the patented invention, it seems quite distinctive to
analogize the concept of possession to determine the reasonable
allowance of after-arising technologies in assertion of patent in-
fringement. It is not anticipated to request the patentee cross a time
gap to enable after-arising technologies by the specification set up
at the date of patent application. Simultaneously, it lacks a justified
ground for the patentee to possess unpredictable after-arising tech-
nologies merely through the satisfaction of enablement require-
ment under which the status of technological development was
fixed at the date of patent application. If the concept of possession
through the analogous application of the enablement requirement
is used to determine the allowance of after-arising technologies, it
is tantamount to following a speculative way to decide the fate of
patent infringement without a justified solid foundation.
Moreover, even though the concept of possession is suitable
as an objective approach to deal with the issue of after-arising
technologies under patent infringement, the test of enablement,
with reference to the specification, works poorly to detect the types
of after-arising technologies that overcompensate patentees dis-
proportionally to the contribution of the original patent to the pub-
lic. Therefore, it is possible some after-arising technologies were
proven to be possessed by the patentee, but such possession would
fail to secure a balance between the scope of exclusive rights and
the technological contributions a patent is anticipated by patent
law legislators to convey. Under this phenomenon, the imbalance
of interest considerations seems harmful to the gist of patent law
promoting cumulative innovation.
5. The Approach ofAnalogous Non-obviousness
As argued above, in terms of the non-obviousness require-
ment under patent law, exclusive rights are justified by the excel-
lence of the inventive quality a patent established, when compared
with prior art. By the same token, we have to admit that any in-
ventive quality produced by after-arising technologies, which is
more excellent than an original invention and is endowed inherent-
ly, never comes within the scope of patent claims, either through
the assertion of literal infringement or the application of the DOE.
Otherwise, opportunities to substantially improve or refine the
20151
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original invention under a patent would be hindered. However, fol-
lowing the aforesaid observation, the patentee may enjoy any in-
ventive quality beyond the original granting scope of the patent
caused by after-arising technologies merely by relying upon the
mechanical application of claim interpretation and the DOE.
Instead of focusing upon the patent disclosure to ensure the
legal possession of a patent, the non-obviousness requirement in-
deed functions to distinguish the inventive quality in order to set
up a reasonable boundary of qualitative superiority, when compar-
ing a patent with prior art. Correspondingly, the reasonable scope
of exclusive rights also will follow such a boundary to meet the
legislative purpose of patent law. Consequently, the non-
obviousness requirement is qualified as a legal lever to deal with
the issues of after-arising technologies and to discover the reason-
able allowance of those technologies under the determination of
patent infringement. The author believes that to analogize the non-
obviousness requirement to patent infringement would be condu-
cive to resolving disputes regarding the uses of after-arising tech-
nologies to practice claims by the accuser.
i. The Structure ofAnalogous Non-obviousness
To specify the idea of mutatis mutandis in the non-
obviousness requirement, the author proposes a test model in
which a defense may be raised against the patent infringement on
condition that the accuser took advantage of after-arising technol-
ogies to practice a claim or claims. The defense is related to the
non-obviousness requirement, but it did not serve as a mechanism
to invalidate the infringed patent. Its sole function is to adjust the
adequate scope of a claim initiated by the assertion of literal in-
fringement or the application of the DOE after screening the after-
arising technologies the accuser used as part of infringement. In
fact, from the point of view of comparative law under various ju-
risdictions, this approach should not be unfamiliar in the determi-
nation of patent infringement. The U.S. case, Wilson Sporting
Goods Co. v. David Geoffery & Associates, adopted a similar con-
324
32
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss2/3
PA TENT INFRINGEMENT
cept of non-obviousness to prevent prior art from the interference
of exclusive rights under the DOE.6 4
Under the model proposed by the author, the test, which is
similar to that of the Wilson Sporting Goods Co. case, is grounded
on a hypothetical base. First, the precondition for the test is that
the practice of a patent claim for the accused product or process
constitutes infringement through either claim interpretation or the
application of the DOE. Second, the aforesaid claim practice
should be built upon the fact that the accuser took advantage of af-
ter-arising technologies to facilitate the patent infringement. The
hypothetical claim is then formed by reference to the accused
product or process. By raising the defense against patent infringe-
ment under this circumstance, where after-arising technologies are
involved, the accuser may request the court regard the infringed
patent as being among prior art over the hypothetical claim men-
tioned above. If sufficient evidence brought by the accuser in front
of the court is capable of proving the lack of non-obviousness,
based on the evaluation of a PHOSITA, at the time of infringe-
ment, it would represent that the accused product or process was
incarnated with more excellent inventive quality than that of the
infringed patent. Pursuant to the justification established on the
balance of the scope of exclusive rights and technological contri-
bution made by a patent, the patentee is not allowed to cover any
inventive quality not contributed by the patent. From this angle,
the defense against patent infringement should be affirmed to emp-
ty the assertion of literal infringement or the application of the
DOE.
In this situation, after-arising technologies are not within the
reasonable allowance under patent law and should be reserved for
future potential inventors to apply for patents. In the following ex-
ample of my proposal, it is assumed that Claim 1 of Patent A is
composed of Element XI, Element Y, and Element Z. The infring-
er manufactured infringing products by taking advantage of Ele-
ment X6, Element Y, and Element Z to practice Claim 1. In other
words, the infringing products were categorized into three ele-
ments, respectively Element X6, Element Y, and Element Z. In
addition, we also assume that the patentee's exclusive right to
64 Wilson Sporting Goods Co v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d at 684-85.
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make was violated by the manufacture of infringing products be-
cause Element X6 was either read into the literal scope of Element
XI or evaluated as an insubstantial change to Claim 1 by corre-
sponding to Element X6 under the DOE. The condition needs be
set up so that Element X6 is among the after-arising technologies.
That is to say, Element X6 is not available until after the date of
patent application.
According to the author's proposal and based on the hypo-
thetical facts mentioned above, if the patentee took legal action
against the infringer by arguing for the patent infringement on
Claim 1 of Patent A, through either the determination of literal in-
fringement or the application of the DOE, it is the infringer's bur-
den to prove that Element X6 is an after-arising technology. Only
when the infringer proves the after-arising technology did not
cause any further dispute would it be the infringer's option to de-
fend the patent infringement by challenging the justification of
claim construction on the after-arising technology.
My proposal creates a hypothetical test of non-obviousness
for such a defense. In my scenario, compared with the traditional
evaluation of non-obviousness regarding the requirement of pa-
tentability, a hypothetical non-obviousness test functions accord-
ing to three steps. The first step is to identify the invention as the
subject matter of the test. This step seems easily simplified in the
traditional evaluation of the requirement of non-obviousness to
satisfy patentability, but it presents a significant meaning in the
hypothetical test for constraining the after-arising technologies to a
reasonable extent under claim construction. To achieve the goal of
checks on reasonable allowance of the after-arising technology, it
is surely necessary to consider the infringing products as patented
ones. Meaning, by abstracting tangible products to intangible ide-
as, the idea to manufacture infringing products or execute infring-
ing process will be the hypothetical invention claimed in an inven-
tion. In this scenario of infringing products, the infringer practicing
Element X6 with other elements serves as an assumption to equate
the idea to manufacture the infringing product with the hypothet-
ical claim.
The second step is designed to establish the scope of the prior
art of an invention claimed in a patent. Instead of the date of patent
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application, the hypothetical non-obviousness test takes the date of
patent infringement as the basis of prior art. Except for the differ-
ence in the time point used to measure prior art, the hypothetical
non-obviousness test and the traditional requirement of non-
obviousness have shared a common track to delimit prior art. Un-
der the traditional requirement of obviousness, the concept of
"analogous art" under the U.S. system or the concept of "closest
art" under the E.U. system is often used to determine the availabil-
ity of prior art through pragmatic means.65 The hypothetical non-
obviousness test surely follows either "analogous art" or "closest
art" to pursue its designed function.
For example, under the concept of analogous art, it is neces-
sary to ascertain the technologies that are within the same field as
the aforesaid hypothetical claim, or are reasonably pertinent to par-
ticular problems the aforesaid hypothetical claim is assumed to in-
volve, but a distinctive field from the hypothetical claim. Such
technologies may be collected as prior art to the hypothetical claim
at the date of patent infringement. In practice, Claim 1 should not
be ignored and should reach the scope of prior art for the hypothet-
ical claim. The final step in the hypothetical non-obviousness test
is to rely upon a PHOSITA to evaluate whether the difference be-
tween the hypothetical claim and its prior art is obvious to a
PHOSITA, as the traditional non-obviousness requirement did.
At this stage, regardless of whether the U.S. model or Euro-
pean model is followed, the level of the art skill owned by a
PHOSITA is determined. Additionally, under this situation, the
teaching, suggestion, and motivation launched by prior art to in-
duce the hypothetical claim also would be accurately concerned.
As soon as such causation is established in the view of a
PHOSITA, the non-obviousness requirement typically has a nega-
tive evaluation. The causation may be read similarly with the
teaching suggestion and motivation (TSM) test, the concept of
65 See In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992)("Two criteria have
evolved for determining whether prior art is analogous: (1) whether the art is
from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if
the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the ref-
erence still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the in-
ventor is involved." See also In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011); K-
Tec, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18773 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 6,
2012). See also HACON & PAGENBERG, supra note 21, at 54.
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"obvious to try," the doctrine of "teaching away" and even the
consideration of secondary factors, which have all been developed
by US case law.66
ii. The Application ofAnalogous Non-obviousness
When the aforesaid three steps for the evaluation of non-
obviousness under the hypothetical non-obviousness test are com-
pleted, if the result shows that the hypothetical claim cannot satisfy
the requirement of non-obviousness in the hypothetical status, the
conclusion is the infringer took advantage of Element X6, Element
Y, and Element Z to have the infringement composed of Element
X1, Element Y and Element Z in terms of technological qualitative
excellence. As addressed above, the requirement of non-
obviousness under patent law serves as a core benchmark to fix a
reasonable technological status beyond prior art to justify any as-
66 On the TSM test, a popular approach adopted in the U.S. court of Appeal for
the Federal Circuit to evaluate the non-obviousness requirement, please see
ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 227-36 (9th ed.
2009). On the concept of "obvious to try," please see In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d
894, 902-903 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("In some cases, what would have been 'obvious
to try' would have been to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible
choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave
either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to
which of many possible choices is likely to be successful... In others, what was
'obvious to try' was to explore a new technology or general approach that
seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only
general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to
achieve it.") ("Obviousness does not require absolute predictability of success.
Indeed, for many inventions that seem quite obvious, there is no absolute pre-
dictability of success until the invention is reduced to practice. There is always
at least a possibility of unexpected results, that would then provide an objective
basis for showing that the invention, although apparently obvious, was in law
nonobvious." On the doctrine of "teaching away," please see ROBERT L.
HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 205-07 (9th ed. 2009). As to
secondary considerations for the non-obviousness requirement, please see Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1966) ("Such secondary considera-
tions as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or non-
obviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.").
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sertion of patent infringement in the future. Even though Element
X6 is among the after-arising technologies, compared with Claim
1, this never changes the technological status beyond prior art en-
dowed by a patent in which the patentee subsumes Element X6 in-
to the scope of exclusive rights through claim construction or the
DOE. Neither should it be minded that extending Claim 1 to cover
Element X6 risks hindering the public from using such element to
do technological improvements or further innovations. Conse-
quently, the defense of after-arising technologies cannot be sus-
tained in this situation, and the use of Element X6 to manufacture
infringing products still constitutes patent infringement through ei-
ther claim construction or the DOE.
When the result of the hypothetical non-obviousness test in-
dicates the opposite of the aforesaid situation, the hypothetical
claim is evaluated as non-obvious under patent law. The incorpo-
ration of Element X6 into Claim 1 through asserting literal in-
fringement or applying the DOE seems to cause metamorphosis of
the original technological status beyond prior art. The enrichment
caused by Element X6 should be left for further innovations and
patent applications. Importantly, the enrichment by Element X6
would not be solely occupied by the patentee in accordance with
the gist of patent law. In this situation, it is adequate for the court
to hold that the defense of after-arising technologies is successfully
made against the assertion of patent infringement. Although the in-
fringer might be exempted by the defense of after-arising technol-
ogies, this does not necessarily mean that the infringer gains the
domination of Element X6 combined with Elements Y and Z by
the decision. It should be clarified that the manufacture of infring-
ing products is still exposed to the development of other inven-
tions, especially those products conceived and filed application for
a patent after the application of Patent A.
The determination of literal infringement through claim con-
struction and the application of the DOE is deeply rooted in vari-
ous jurisdictions of patent law. The two types of patent infringe-
ment are also strongly justified because they fulfill the patentee's
obligation to the public trust by providing notification of exclusive
right and a policy of fair protection. Clearly, the defense of after-
arising technologies seems to challenge the original justification of
assertion of patent infringement. No matter how significant the de-
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fense of after-arising technologies is in securing the essence of pa-
tent law and policy, it is undeniable that the determination of pa-
tent infringement, even if done mechanically, deserves a prima fa-
cie on the appropriateness of technological status the patentee
enjoys for both parties concerned. It is the infringer's burden to
raise sufficient evidence to assist the court in the evaluation of
non-obviousness under the hypothetical non-obviousness test. Any
failure to provide factual proof in connection with the hypothetical
non-obviousness test will cause the infringer to bear the stringent
effects of patent infringement.
1II. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PRACTICAL PROPOSAL
Claim construction, without doubt, is a game of words. In
order to ascertain the satisfaction of the patentability requirement
and evaluate patent infringement, the interpretation of a claim with
its related specification always serves as highly significance to a
PHOSITA. In line with this thought, a sound patent law system is
secured by a justified claim construction that reasonably leads to
the most adequate results in grants of patents and assertions of ex-
clusive rights. However, it is worth observing that the relevancy of
the difference between the requirements of patentability and the
scope of exclusive rights has been received minimal notice in vari-
ous jurisdictions of patent law.
This article showed that the novelty and non-obviousness
requirements, are, in fact, endowed with an implicit indication of
the reasonable extent to which the patentee could exercise the ex-
clusive right against the public through claim construction and
even the application of the DOE. This article argues that only
within the scope of any technological contribution that is more
highly excellent than prior art under a claim, the patentee may be
entitled to implementing the exclusive rights to seek remedies for
patent infringement. From this angle, the requirement of non-
obviousness could be applied as a lever to detect a reasonable
claim interpretation on the determination of literal infringement
and the application of the DOE. This article also proposes this lev-
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The issue of after-arising technologies has been lurking in
the system of patent law because of inherent characteristics of the
system. The determination of literal infringement is established in
accordance with the technological status of the patent application.
Claim construction was made to grasp the inventor's real intention
of the patent, which is recognized by a PHOSITA at the date of pa-
tent application. However, it seems no promised mechanism exists
to distinguish the reasonable allowance of after-arising technolo-
gies when claim construction was made to determine whether pa-
tent infringement exists or not. The DOE is also vulnerable to the
risk of ignoring the development of after-arising technologies, de-
termined by the three-tripartite test or the insubstantial test. The
purpose of fair protection for the DOE often preempts the recogni-
tion of reality in the development of after-arising technologies.
Furthermore, the time of application of the DOE at the date of pa-
tent infringement is misconceived to suppose that all after-arising
technologies are tolerable under the DOE. It may be observed that
the defense of prior art against the application of the DOE is af-
firmed in various jurisdictions. However, the concept of protecting
specific after-arising technologies from interference by the DOE
has not been formed in case law or judicial cases, even though
such technologies are highly connected to the possibility of tech-
nological improvement or cumulative innovations, which concern
the legislators of patent law.
Moreover, the issue of after-arising technologies has not
drawn sufficient attention with regard to emerging economies. One
possible reason for this phenomenon is that they are shadowed by
the aforesaid systematic defects that hinder insight into the issue of
after-arising technologies on claim construction or the application
of the DOE. Another possible reason may be the fact that the high
rate of invalidating granted patents because of concerns of patent
quality in the court would lead those jurisdictions to distract from
the issue that would be among the defenses against patent in-
fringement. However, this does not mean the issue of after-arising
technologies is indifferent in emerging economies. When patent
quality is gradually improved to a reasonable level by learning
from the lessons experienced in the jurisdictions of the U.S. and
E.U., one focus on achieving a sound patent law system is un-
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doubtedly attributed to the evaluation of after-arising technologies
in the determination of patent infringement.
In order to seek an optimal model to deal with the issue of
after-arising technologies under patent infringement, some aca-
demics have proposed solutions to detect the reasonable allowance
of after-arising technologies in claim construction or the applica-
tion of the DOE. In the author's opinion, all alternatives proposed
for the issue of after-arising technologies share a common feature,
by which approaches other than technological evaluation were
used to distinguish the kinds of after-arising technologies that may
be within the scope of exclusive rights from those that may not.
While the parameters of "thing" and "meaning" focus on the char-
acteristics of patented products, either structurally or linguistically,
the test of enablement extends the capability of the original speci-
fication to infringing products containing after-arising technolo-
gies to ascertain whether they are matched.
As the author observed, the jurisprudence of the non-
obviousness requirement of patentability is an enlightening link
between the determination of patent infringement and the ad-
vantage of technological excellence enjoyed by a claim over prior
art. It is arguably inferred that the patentee is not entitled to includ-
ing the technologies used in patent infringement into the scope of
exclusive rights, provided that such technologies belong to the ad-
vantages beyond prior art. In particular, the article transposes the
concept of non-obviousness by evaluating the technological ad-
vantages to check the reasonable allowance of after-arising tech-
nologies in the determination of patent infringement. The case of
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. under U.S. patent case law was pre-
sented as a hypothetical test of non-obviousness to determine
whether the defense of prior art against application of the DOE
works. This article uses the concept of non-obviousness to apply
mutatis mutandis to the patent infringement made by the after-
arising technologies, by the establishment of a hypothetical test
that is similar to the test in Wilson Sporting Goods Co.
It is admitted that the test of non-obviousness for the after-
arising technologies runs into the same predicament of uncertainty
as the traditional test does for the non-obviousness requirement for
patentability. In addition, to set up the scope of relevant prior art
and provide evidence to evaluate the causation of prior art over the
332
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patent also possibly frustrates the infringer's incentive to bring a
defense against the coverage of after-arising technologies in a
claim. However, the author believes that the test to filter the rea-
sonable allowance of after-arising technologies for patent in-
fringement stands firm in complying with the gist of patent law,
the ultimate goal of which is to promote technological progress by
creating sustainable room for cumulative innovations. The pro-
posed model is workable because it links tightly to the concept of
non-obviousness. As an exception to the exercise of exclusive
rights, the test of non-obviousness should not interfere with or
preempt the determination of a patent by either claim construction
or the application of DOE. Therefore, the author proposes that the
determination of patent infringement would constitute a prima fa-
cie of the appropriateness of the technological status for availabil-
ity of the patentee's exclusive rights. Nevertheless, it is the in-
fringer's option, as well as burden, to bring a defense derived from
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